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PREVENTING TRAFFICKING THROUGH NEW
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OVER LABOR
MIGRATION
Janie A. Chuang*
The year 2020 marks the twentieth anniversary of the United
Nations (U.N.) Trafficking Protocol—a treaty that established the
foundation for global efforts to address the problem of human
trafficking.1 That treaty offered an early framing of the problem as a
transnational crime, best addressed through aggressive prosecution of
traffickers and international cooperation to that end.2 Since the
Protocol’s adoption, global antitrafficking law and policy have
evolved significantly. The once near-exclusive focus on the
prosecution prong of the treaty’s “3Ps” approach to
trafficking— focused on prosecuting trafficking, protecting trafficked
persons, and preventing trafficking—has given way to an increased
emphasis on victim protection.3 Prevention, however, remains the 3Ps’
most neglected prong. Prevention efforts have narrowly focused on
public awareness campaigns to warn vulnerable populations, as well

*
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University Law Review for including me in this Symposium on “Prioritizing Prevention in Human
Trafficking: Research, Innovation, and Advocacy.” I am grateful for the insights and feedback on the
ideas presented in this Article that I received from Tendayi Achiume, Daniel Costa, Cathryn Costello,
Heather Hughes, Daniela Kraiem, Loren Landau, Genevieve LeBaron, Neha Misra, Fernanda Nicola,
Ashley Parrish, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Ezra Rosser, and participants of the Berkeley Law Migration
Workshop, the Oxford University Workshop on IOM, and the Expert Working Group for the Study of
Slavery at the Yale Gilder-Lehrman Center. Thanks also to Melissa Martin, Madeline Creps, and Krishna
Pathak for their excellent research assistance, and the GSU Law Review editors for their patience and
careful review of drafts of this Article.
1. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 3, opened for
signature Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.
2. Id. at arts. 2, 4.
3. Id. at arts. 5 (prosecution), 6–8 (protection), 9–11 (prevention); 3Ps: Prosecution, Protection, and
Prevention, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/3ps-prosecution-protection-and-prevention/
[https://perma.cc/6ST5-SGQS] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
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as potential consumers of trafficked goods and services, of the risks
and many manifestations of human trafficking.4
We have reached a critical inflection point in our understanding of
the trafficking phenomenon and how best to address it. With too few
traffickers prosecuted and too few victims protected, more robust
efforts to prevent trafficking are clearly necessary. In 2018,
governments around the world identified a total of 85,613 victims,
brought 11,096 prosecutions, and obtained 7,481 convictions.5
Considering the claim that purportedly 40.3 million people are in
“modern slavery” worldwide,6 prosecution and post-hoc protection
strategies have hardly made a dent in the problem.7 That is particularly
so for nonsexual labor trafficking, which despite constituting 80% of
forced labor/trafficking cases worldwide,8 accounted for only 4% of
prosecutions, 3% of convictions, and 13% of victims identified by
global law enforcement authorities in 2018.9
Efforts by advocates to draw attention to nonsexual labor trafficking
have underscored how trafficking is not simply the product of deviant,
criminal behavior that once rooted out can easily be eliminated. Also
to blame are deeply embedded societal structures that facilitate and
even reward exploitation—in particular, weak labor and migration
frameworks that perpetuate precarity for migrant workers in their
search for economic opportunities. Because worker exploitation and
trafficking differ in degree, not in kind,10 addressing migrant worker
4. Id.
5. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 38 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 U.S. TIP
REPORT].
6. Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, at 9 (2017),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/
wcms_575479.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H3V-ZG4P] [hereinafter 2017 GEMS].
7. 2019 U.S. TIP REPORT, supra note 5, at 2–3.
8. 2017 GEMS, supra note 6, at 10. The estimated 40.3 million people in “modern slavery” include
15.4 million people living in forced marriage and 24.9 million in forced labor. Id. at 9. Of those in forced
labor, 20.1 million were in nonsexual forced labor, while 4.8 million were in “forced sexual exploitation.”
Id. at 10.
9. 2019 U.S. TIP REPORT, supra note 5. The statistics cited in the text accompanying note 5 include
a breakout of the total prosecutions, convictions, and victims identified in cases involving nonsexual labor
trafficking in 2018: 11,096 (457) prosecutions; 7,481 (259) convictions; 85,613 (11,009) victims
identified. Id.
10. Hila Shamir, A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 76, 110 (2012).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss4/6

2

Chuang: Preventing Trafficking Through New Global Governance over Labor M

2020]

PREVENTING TRAFFICKING

1029

exploitation more broadly can prevent the abuses from escalating into
trafficking.11
Recent developments in the international migration field present an
opportunity to address structural contributors to trafficking by
establishing norms and institutions to foster safe labor migration. In
2015, large-scale mixed movements of refugees and migrants
prompted the U.N. General Assembly to recognize the need for closer
cooperation and greater responsibility-sharing and action to address
the phenomenon.12 This ultimately resulted in the U.N. General
Assembly adopting, in December 2018, two global compacts: a Global
Compact on Refugees (Refugee Compact)13 and a Global Compact for
Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM).14 While the Refugee
Compact builds upon an established regime of laws, policies, and
institutions, the GCM signifies a long overdue first attempt by the
international community to develop a framework for pursuing a shared
vision of safe and orderly global migration.15
Unlike refugees, migrant workers are the focus of only a handful of
international treaties.16 These treaties suffer from notoriously low
ratification rates, and the few States that have ratified them are
primarily countries of origin—rather than the destination countries
where migrant workers are in the most immediate need of worker
protections.17 Moreover, no international institution exists to facilitate
11. Id.
12. G.A. Res. 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Sept. 19, 2016) [hereinafter
New York Declaration].
13. G.A. Res. 73/151, Global Compact on Refugees (Dec. 17, 2018).
14. G.A. Res. 73/195, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (Dec. 19, 2018)
[hereinafter GCM].
15. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 15.
16. Mariette Grange, Int’l Catholic Migration Comm’n, Strengthening Protection of Migrant Workers
and their Families with International Human Rights Treaties, at 13 (Mar. 2006),
https://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Strengthening_protection_of_migrant_workers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/333Y-M55Q].
17. For example, only fifty-five countries have ratified the U.N. Migrant Workers Convention, most
of which are countries in Africa and Central and South America. Status of Ratification Interactive
Dashboard, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., https://indicators.ohchr.org
[https://perma.cc/BS9B-TH7E] (from the dropdown menu, select “International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families”) (last visited May 18,
2020).
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global efforts to address labor migration, unlike institutions for just
about every other issue of significant global concern—for example,
the World Trade Organization (trade), the World Intellectual Property
Organization (intellectual property), and the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (refugees), among others.
At long last, the GCM seeks to begin filling these normative and
institutional gaps—suggesting the possibility of new global
governance over migration. In addition to establishing a set of
objectives for safe, orderly, and regular migration, the GCM assigns
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to the role of
secretariat and coordinator for U.N. efforts to assist States with GCM
implementation.18 The GCM, in effect, affirms the IOM’s status as
lead global migration agency, a role the IOM first quietly assumed in
2016 when it became a “related organization” of the United Nations
after decades operating on the periphery of the international system.19
This Article offers initial thoughts on the possible impacts the GCM
might have on global efforts to prevent and address trafficking,
focusing on the newly elevated role of the IOM in this endeavor. Based
on arguments I have made elsewhere,20 my analysis takes as a given
that a normative, rights-based approach to migrant work is necessary
to prevent migrant worker exploitation and abuse from escalating into
trafficking. From that perspective, the Article explores the possibility
that, in advising States on GCM implementation, the IOM could take
a more proactive role in advancing workers’ rights in furtherance of
the longer-term goal of preventing trafficking.
Part I assesses the GCM’s potential for advancing the rights of
migrant workers. The GCM reflects the three competing interests that
typically animate migration policy: (1) concerns over border security,
(2) the desire to derive labor market benefits from economic migration,

18. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 17.
19. G.A. Res. 70/296, Agreement Concerning the Relationship Between the United Nations and the
International Organization for Migration (July 25, 2016) [hereinafter UN-IOM Agreement].
20. Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J.
INT’L L. 609 (2014); Janie A. Chuang, Using Global Migration Law to Prevent Human Trafficking, 111
AJIL UNBOUND 147 (2017).
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and (3) the imperative to protect migrants’ rights.21 Whether and to
what extent migrant workers are sufficiently protected against
exploitation will turn on how States balance these competing concerns.
Empowered to guide States in their efforts to implement the GCM, the
IOM will play a crucial role in helping to translate GCM norms into
State practice. Part II analyzes the IOM’s operational history and
structure for insights into how the IOM might balance the GCM’s
competing concerns in its efforts to advise States on GCM
implementation. The IOM’s checkered history and its unique status as
a non-normative, U.N.-related organization show a tendency to
prioritize States’ concerns over border security and labor market
access above those regarding migrant welfare.
In contrast, the IOM’s recent efforts to promote ethical recruitment
standards suggest the possibility of IOM assuming a more proactive
stance towards migrant workers’ rights protections going forward.
Part III explores these efforts, situating them within broader
development debates over whether and to what extent rights tradeoffs
are necessary—or acceptable—to maximize the development gains
from migration. In advising States on GCM implementation, how IOM
responds to pressures to trade rights for labor market access will surely
test IOM’s professed commitment to ethical recruitment frameworks.
Its response could prove to be a bellwether of IOM’s broader approach
to balancing migrant worker welfare interests against the GCM’s other
competing interests in border security and labor market access. In this
environment, close scrutiny and strong advocacy by rights advocates
will be necessary to fully realize the GCM’s—and the
IOM’s—potential to advance migrant workers’ rights and prevent
trafficking.
I. The GCM and Labor Migration Norm Development
The latest available estimates indicate that in 2017 there were 258
million international migrants globally (i.e., 3.4% of the world’s
21. See generally GCM, supra note 14 (adopting a global compact to address the challenges and
benefits of migration).
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population), of which 164 million were migrant workers.22 In 2018,
migrants remitted approximately $689 billion worldwide, of which
$529 billion was sent to developing countries—over four times the
amount of official development assistance.23 With remittances
accounting for as much as 40% of a country’s gross domestic product
(GDP),24 it is hardly surprising that out-migration for labor has become
a de facto development policy.25 Not only do struggling economies
benefit from the revenues derived from remittances, but there is also
the added benefit of reduced local unemployment rates. At the same
time, favored destination countries have come to rely heavily on
migrant labor—particularly to fill the so-called 3D (dirty, dangerous,
and difficult) jobs that local workers find less desirable.26
Despite their significant contributions to these economies, however,
migrant workers worldwide suffer from a lack of meaningful labor
protections. The absence of international labor recruitment regulations
has enabled a rapidly growing private labor recruitment industry to
enjoy impunity for a wide range of abusive practices (for example,
exorbitant recruitment fees and contract switching).27 In most
destination countries, migrant workers enjoy limited labor protections,
and, as a result, employers can exert inordinate control over whether
and under what conditions migrant workers labor. For example, under
most temporary guestworker programs around the world, migrant
workers’ visas are tied to specific employers—meaning that when a
worker leaves the employment, even as a result of abusive treatment,

22. Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers: Results and
Methodology, at 5 (2018).
23. Remittances Data, KNOMAD, www.knomad.org/data/remittances [https://perma.cc/FYL9SCBY] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
24. Id. For example, KNOMAD reports the following amounts of remittances as a percentage of GDP
for 2018: Tonga (40.7%), South Sudan (35.3%), Kyrgyz Republic (33.2%), Haiti (30.9%), Tajikistan
(29%), Nepal (28%), El Salvador (20.7%). Id.
25. Kimberly Beaton et al., Migration and Remittances in Latin American and the Caribbean: Engines
of Growth and Macroeconomic Stabilizers? 2 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 17/144, 2017),
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/WP/2017/wp17144.ashx
[https://perma.cc/W93Y9LSF].
26. Id.
27. The GCM devotes an objective to addressing these issues. See GCM supra note 14, ¶ 22.
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the worker’s visa is immediately rendered invalid.28 The threat of
retaliatory termination of employment or deportation can compel
migrant workers to endure abusive working conditions in silence.
These structural features of cross-border labor migration can thus
enable, if not encourage, exploitation of migrant workers that can all
too readily reach trafficking or “modern-day slavery” extremes.
The glaring lack of norms and institutions pertaining to labor
migration reflects a long-standing and deeply rooted bias against
“economic migrants” in the international system. With border control
aptly described as “the last bastion of sovereignty,”29 States have been
deeply reluctant to commit to legal obligations towards nonnationals
within their territories.30 As Professor Tendayi Achiume states,
“nonnationals are definitionally ‘political strangers’ with no
cognizable claims to shaping the trajectory of the respective
nation-state.”31 Sovereignty entails, after all, a nation-state’s ability to
define its political community, and hence the terms of admission and
inclusion concerning nonnationals.32 The singular exception to this
broad privilege to exclude is the obligation that most States have
accepted—under the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its Protocol33—concerning refugees or those whose
migration is compelled by fear of certain forms of persecution by their
home governments.34 Economic migrants, on the other hand—whose
migration is viewed far less sympathetically (as motivated primarily
by the desire for a better life)—have no claim to States’ beneficence
unless they are deemed trafficked.35 And even then, trafficked persons’
claims to the destination country’s protections typically are contingent
28. DANIEL COSTA & PHILIP MARTIN, TEMPORARY LABOR MIGRATION PROGRAMS, ECON. POL’Y
INST. 2 (2018), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/152373.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR3W-MPN3].
29. CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION MEANS FOR
MIGRATION AND LAW 2 (2009).
30. Id.
31. E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1515 (2019)
(emphasis added).
32. Id. at 1523–24.
33. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259 (entered into force
Apr. 22, 1954).
34. Id.
35. Id. (discussing factors that qualify an individual for refugee status, notably excluding economic
disadvantage).
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on their cooperation with efforts to pursue their traffickers—unlike
refugees, whose status as refugees alone triggers State protections.
States’ adherence to a fundamental distinction between refugees and
economic migrants accounts for why the existing normative and
institutional architecture of global migration governance focuses
almost exclusively on refugee populations.
Merely a decade ago, economic migration was viewed as best
addressed at the regional level and through bilateral arrangements.
Engagement at the international level was limited to a series of global
dialogues and consultative processes—such as the U.N. High-Level
Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the Global
Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD).36 These fora enabled
States and other stakeholders to develop “a better common
understanding of contested aspects of migration that are at the centre
of [international] debates, buil[d] trust between participating Member
States[,] and develop[] ideas and data . . . .”37 These dialogues and
consultative processes fostered greater confidence and willingness to
engage in multilateral action. That foundation combined with the need
to address large-scale movements of people over the last five
years—for example, from or through the Middle East and North Africa
to Europe, Central America to the United States, and Bangladesh and
Myanmar to other Southeast Asian countries—incentivized the
international community to finally treat economic migration as an
issue of urgent international concern.38 After all, large-scale
movements can have significant and widespread political, economic,
social, developmental, humanitarian, and human rights ramifications
across borders. A global approach is necessary to prevent and address
the negative repercussions—particularly for developing countries,
which tend to be disproportionately affected and already severely

36. Background, GLOBAL F. MIGRATION & DEV., https://www.gfmd.org/process/background
[https://perma.cc/B5AG-4QYN] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
37. U.N. Secretary-General, Making Migration Work for All, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/72/643 (Dec. 12,
2017).
38. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 2019, at iv, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/SER.A/438, U.N. Sale No. E.20XIII.16 (2019).
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stretched in their efforts to maintain economic and social cohesion and
development in face of these migrant flows.39
The GCM was thus born of the recognition that international
cooperation regarding economic migration is necessary to address the
world’s migration crises.40 The GCM signifies an important turning
point, albeit with some notable limitations. The GCM is a nonbinding
instrument—an unfortunate but necessary concession to bring States
to the negotiating table.41 The United States nonetheless withdrew
from the negotiations in December 2017, and convinced others to
follow suit, arguing that such agreements subvert governments’ ability
to control national borders.42 The GCM explicitly affirms, however,
“the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration
policy and their prerogative to govern migration within their
jurisdiction, in conformity with international law.”43
A few notable holdouts notwithstanding, 164 governments adopted
the GCM in December 2018.44 The GCM’s substantive terms reflect a
compromise among the competing interests of countries of origin,
countries of destination, and the migrants themselves.45 While the
GCM recognizes migrants’ contributions to the communities in which
they reside, it also seeks to address the root causes of migration to
enable people to remain in their home countries rather than have to
migrate for survival. Regrettably, the GCM focuses more on
39. New York Declaration, supra note 12, ¶ 7.
40. GCM, supra note 14.
41. Id. ¶ 7.
42. Olivia Beavers, US Pulls Out of Global Compact on Migration, HILL (Dec. 3, 2017, 1:38 PM)
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/363014-us-pulls-out-of-global-compact-on-migration
[https://perma.cc/9WMV-KA29]. Austria, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Hungary, Israel, Latvia,
Poland, and Slovakia refused to sign the pact citing concern that doing so would infringe upon their
sovereign right to decide issues relating to migration and security. Jessica Toale, Why Have 12 Countries
Pulled Out of the UN Migration Pact?, MEDIUM (Dec. 7, 2018), https://medium.com/@jjtoale/why-have12-countries-pulled-out-of-the-un-migration-pact-a48779aadf2d [https://perma.cc/Q8Q7-597U]. Many
of these countries objected that the GCM failed to sufficiently distinguish between legal and illegal
migration. Id.
43. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 15.
44. General Assembly Officially Adopts Roadmap for Migrants to Improve Safety, Ease Suffering, UN
NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/12/1028941 [https://perma.cc/ZW9C-DAQE].
45. Press Release, World Leaders Adopt First-Ever Global Compact on Migration, Outlining
Framework to Protect Millions of Migrants, Support Countries Accommodating Them, U.N. Press
Release DEV/3375 (Dec. 10, 2018).
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preventing irregular and precarious migration than on creating
additional legal migration pathways—the inclusion of which could
help alleviate the need for migrants to rely on
smugglers-cum-traffickers to facilitate their border crossings.
Limitations aside, however, the GCM could nonetheless be viewed
as progress in acknowledging and beginning to address key structural
contributors to migrants’ vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking.
The GCM contains a list of twenty-three objectives for safe, orderly,
and regular migration, each accompanied by a list of actions States can
take to realize each objective.46 The objectives are wide-ranging in
scope, and when taken as a whole, reflect the GCM drafters’ effort to
balance States’ concerns over border control, their access to flexible
labor markets, and their desire to reduce migrant vulnerability to harm
and exploitation. For example, the objectives call upon States to ensure
migrants have proof of legal identity; to promote faster, safer, and
cheaper transfer of remittances; and to enhance consular protection and
assistance throughout the course of migration.47
One of the GCM objectives specifically targets trafficking
(Objective 10: “[p]revent, combat and eradicate trafficking”) and
includes a list of ten suggested actions to realize that goal.48 The
recommended actions focus on law enforcement measures designed to
suppress negative phenomena related to trafficking. These include, for
example, monitoring irregular migration routes and cross-border
intelligence sharing to disrupt financial flows associated with
trafficking. The proposed actions also feature strategies to empower
actual and potential victims—such as awareness-raising campaigns to
educate migrants of the risks of trafficking and improved access to
justice for victims and those at risk of becoming victims.49 Indeed, the
recommended actions go further than the U.N. Trafficking Protocol in
at least two crucial respects. First, the GCM recommends that States
“avoid criminalization of migrants who are victims of trafficking in
46.
47.
48.
49.

GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 6.
Id. ¶¶ 4, 14, 20.
Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
Id. ¶ 17.
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persons for trafficking-related offen[s]es.”50 Second, it recommends
that States “[e]nsure that the victim receives appropriate protection and
assistance, not conditional upon cooperation with the authorities
against suspected traffickers.”51 Both are guarantees that human rights
advocates had unsuccessfully sought to have included in the U.N.
Trafficking Protocol.52
But perhaps even more significant for antitrafficking efforts are the
non-trafficking-specific provisions of the GCM that, if meaningfully
implemented, would significantly reduce vulnerability to trafficking
by targeting structural contributors to migrant worker exploitation.
Many migrant workers throughout the world labor under conditions
that do not rise to the level of trafficking, yet they suffer significant
rights violations for which meaningful access to protection and redress
is limited, if not nonexistent. If left unchecked, such exploitation can
readily worsen and become trafficking. Attending to the structures that
enable these lesser abuses to occur, therefore, can reduce migrants’
vulnerability to exploitation, and help prevent trafficking.
Take, for instance, GCM Objective 6, which seeks to “[f]acilitate
fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure
decent work.”53 Objective 6 targets abusive labor recruitment practices
that can foster situations of debt bondage and forced labor.54 The
suggested actions States might take to fulfill Objective 6 include, for
example, prohibiting recruiters and employers from charging or
shifting recruitment fees or related costs to migrant workers; allowing
migrant workers to change employers; and ensuring migrants safe
access to effective complaint and redress mechanisms for workplace
violations “in a manner that does not exacerbate vulnerabilities of
migrants who denounce such incidents.”55

50. Id.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and
Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1677 (2010); Anne Gallagher, Human Rights
and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS.
Q. 975, 990–91 (2001).
53. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 12.
54. Id.
55. Id. ¶¶ 12–13.
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These suggested actions, if implemented, would address major
factors that feed the exploitation and trafficking of migrant workers.
The ability to charge recruitment fees provides unscrupulous
employers (and recruiters) tremendous leverage to prevent migrant
workers from leaving even extreme situations of exploitation. Many
migrant workers cannot afford to pay the fees upfront, and often obtain
loans—sometimes at exorbitant interest rates and with family assets
put up as collateral—that they pledge to reimburse with their earnings.
The penalties associated with defaulting on these loans further
disincentivize migrant workers from complaining about workplace
abuses, as doing so can result in retaliatory termination, retaliatory
deportation, and blacklisting from future jobs. Moreover, if
terminated, the worker may not be able to seek employment from a
new employer if—as is the case for most guestworker programs
around the world—the worker’s visa is tied to specific employers, such
that leaving that employer immediately renders the visa invalid and the
worker out of status.56 Taking the suggested actions for Objective 6 to
prohibit recruitment fees, eliminate employer-tying of visas, and
provide anti-retaliation protections, would go a long way to reducing
migrant worker vulnerability to trafficking.
None of these suggested actions are new recommendations. They
encapsulate what rights advocates have long argued, with limited
success, ought to be incorporated into laws and regulations governing
migrant work. For example, rights advocates in the United States have
sought laws to protect migrant workers who report labor violations
from retaliatory deportation and termination, only to have proposed
legislation languish in the U.S. Congress.57 U.S. rights advocates have
also sought a prohibition on recruitment fees. While they have
succeeded with respect to workers employed by federal contractors
and subcontractors that provide goods and services to the U.S.
government,58 they have made few inroads towards achieving a
prohibition on recruitment fees for U.S. guestworker programs writ
56. COSTA & MARTIN, supra note 28.
57. See, e.g., Protect Our Workers from Exploitation and Retaliation Act, H.R. 5908, 115th Cong.
(2018).
58. See FAR 22.1703(a)(5)–(7) (2019).
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large—in no small part due to strong objections from business
associations. Groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have
argued, for example, that only unreasonable (as opposed to all)
recruitment fees should be prohibited, and in any event, that the term
recruitment fees should be narrowly construed to exclude many of the
fees typically charged to workers (for example, visa processing and
transportation fees).59 On an even more discouraging trajectory,
employer-tying remains the norm in guestworker programs in the U.S.
and many countries abroad, particularly in Gulf States utilizing a
kafala system.60 Israel banned employer-tying (known as “binding”
there) in the domestic work sector in 2010, only to reinstate it a year
later in response to strong lobbying by elderly and disabled groups
concerned about caregiver turnover.61 In a similarly regressive move
in 2012, the United Kingdom introduced employer-tying of visas for
domestic workers as part of a broader effort to restrict entry of
low-skilled migrants62—resulting in markedly increased rates of abuse
as compared to the previous period when domestic workers were free
to change employers.63
59. Note that these arguments were made in the context of prohibitions on recruitment fees in the U.S.
government contracting context. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule of the FAR Case 2015-0017, Combating Trafficking in Persons-Definition of “Recruitment
Fees” (81 Fed. Reg. 29244) (July 11, 2016); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., Letter on the Senior
Policy Operating Group to Combat Trafficking in Persons Draft Definition for “Recruitment Fees” (FAR
Case 2014-001–Ending Trafficking in Persons) (Mar. 18, 2015). Though the U.S. government ultimately
released a broad definition of “recruitment fees,” it did so over three years after the prohibition was
promulgated. Combating Trafficking in Persons—Definition of “Recruitment Fees,” 83 Fed. Reg. 65,466
(Dec. 20, 2018) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 22, 52).
60. LAUREN A. APGAR, ECON. POLICY INST., AUTHORIZED STATUS, LIMITED RETURNS 1, 3 (2015),
https://www.epi.org/publication/authorized-status-limited-returns-labor-market-outcomes-temporarymexican-workers/ [https://perma.cc/GNQ3-QUJU]; Zorana Knezevic, The Kafala Labor-Sponsorship
TRAFFICKING
CTR.
(Apr.
24,
2019),
System
in
the
Gulf
States,
HUM.
https://humantraffickingcenter.org/the-kafala-labor-sponsorship-system-in-the-gulf-states/
[https://perma.cc/VZ3M-5SW3].
61. Adriana Kemp & Rebeca Raijman, Bringing in State Regulations, Private Brokers, and Local
Employers: A Meso-Level Analysis of Labor Trafficking in Israel, 48 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 604,
617–18 (2014).
62. Siobhán Mullally & Clíodhna Murphy, Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK: Enacting
Exclusions, Exemptions, and Rights, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 397, 411, 413 (2014).
63. KALAYAAN, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE TIED MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKER VISA
(2013), http://www.kalayaan.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Slavery-by-a-new-name-Briefing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/74CD-HUMQ]. Kalayaan, a London-based domestic workers’ rights organization,
reported that after introduction of employer-tying, there was a significant increase in numbers of domestic
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Although the GCM suggests States undertake targeted action in all
of these areas, as the above shows, ensuring that States actually do so
will require overcoming significant resistance by States and by
powerful nonstate actors to whom States have long outsourced labor
migration governance. The goal of improving migrant worker welfare
will inevitably be weighed against the competing concerns of
facilitating access to foreign labor markets and maintaining border
control. As secretariat and coordinator of U.N. efforts to assist States
with GCM implementation, the IOM is well-positioned to influence
state actions on such matters. But determining how the IOM might
weigh the competing concerns requires a closer look at the IOM’s
operational history and structure.
II. The IOM and “Migration Management”
Before becoming a U.N.-related organization in 2016, the IOM
existed largely on the periphery of the international system. Despite its
extensive operations on the ground, the IOM has rarely been examined
in academic literature, in part due to misperceptions of its historical
insignificance as a glorified travel agency and also its opacity as an
institution.64 Its newly elevated status, however, put a spotlight on the
organization, illuminating two aspects of the IOM’s structure and
operational history that raise concerns over the human rights and labor
rights implications of the IOM’s new role. The first is the IOM’s
checkered history of operations that have both advanced but also
severely constrained—if not violated—the rights of migrants. The
second is the IOM’s status as a related organization rather than a U.N.
specialized agency.65 Contrary to what one might assume from the
IOM’s self-description as “U.N. Migration,” the IOM operates
independently of the United Nations. Moreover, the IOM does not
workers who experienced decreased pay or no pay at all, confinement in the home, passport confiscation,
and psychological abuse. Id.
64. See generally Antoine Pécoud, What Do We Know About the International Organization for
Migration?, 44 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1621 (2017).
65. Press Release, IOM Becomes a Related Organization to the U.N., Int’l Org. Migration (July 25,
2016), https://www.iom.int/news/iom-becomes-related-organization-un [https://perma.cc/Y46M-JQ7W].
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have a normative protection mandate, unlike U.N. specialized agencies
also dealing with migrant populations, such as the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the
International Labour Organization (ILO).66 Given the IOM’s
operational history and its non-normative mandate, whether the IOM
would prioritize migrant welfare in advising States on GCM
implementation is far from certain.
A. The IOM’s Operational History
Founded in 1951, the IOM has grown from a small,
intergovernmental body of sixteen Member States to an organization
of 173 Member States (and a further eight States with observer
status).67 As a non-normative organization, the IOM is not required to
engage in rights-based governance. Its constitution simply establishes
that the IOM is to provide migration services to its Member States and
that in carrying out its functions, the IOM is to cooperate with other
entities concerned with migration and to recognize the primacy of
national law.68 To implement this mandate, the IOM maintains a small
headquarters office in Geneva, while its approximately 10,000
employees primarily staff the IOM’s 500 field offices and duty stations
located in over 100 countries.69 The IOM works in four areas of
migration management: migration and development, facilitating
migration, regulating migration, and addressing forced migration.70 Its
diverse activities have included, for example, refugee resettlement,
repatriation of trafficked persons and unsuccessful asylum seekers,

66. NICHOLAS R. MICINSKI & THOMAS G. WEISS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION
AND THE U.N. SYSTEM: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY, FUTURE U.N. DEV. SYS. 3 (2016).

67. About IOM, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION, https://www.iom.int/about-iom [https://perma.cc/693VDWBH] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter About IOM].
68. Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 1, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION https://www.iom.int/constitution
[https://perma.cc/3855-BVDX] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter IOM Constitution].
69. Megan Bradley, The International Organization for Migration (IOM): Gaining Power in the
Forced Migration Regime, REFUGE, Mar. 23, 2017, at 97, 101; About IOM, supra note 67.
70. U.N. Migration, Our Work, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION, https://www.iom.int/our-work
[https://perma.cc/4RBG-4SKR] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
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labor recruitment, certification of third-party labor recruiters, and
implementation of immigrant detention programs, among others.71
This wide range of activities is at least partly attributable to the
IOM’s funding model. Unlike U.N. specialized agencies, the IOM
does not have a regular budget that funds its operations.72 Article 20
of the IOM Constitution provides that cash contributions from
Member States will fund the IOM’s administrative budget, while its
operational budget will be funded through voluntary contributions
provided in exchange for the IOM’s migration services.73 The IOM’s
operational funding thus relies on projectization or activity-based
costing such that the IOM offices and staff depend on the acquisition
of projects for survival. As Dr. Fabian Georgi explains, projectization
“creates an instrumental-rational logic that establishes the monetary
value of a project as an independent and important factor in addition
to its practical use-value or its normative justification.”74
Projectization combined with the IOM’s decentralized structure results
in the IOM operating like a private company or a “bureaucratic
entrepreneur” whose first priority is survival.75 This funding structure
has created the perception that the “IOM as an agency will do anything
as long as there’s money with which to do it.”76 The IOM’s heavy
reliance on projects for mostly western governments of industrialized
countries—which have come to rely on the IOM for its “jack of all
trades” flexibility and its logistical efficiency in project delivery—has
fed the perception that the IOM is an “instrument of Northern foreign
policy.”77
The IOM’s funding structure and its lack of a normative mandate
have fostered the perception that the IOM is a “deeply ambivalent
71. About IOM, supra note 67.
72. IOM Constitution, supra note 68, at ch. 7, art. 20.
73. Id.
74. Fabian Georgi, For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration and Its
Global Migration Management, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT 45, 63
(Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud eds., 2010).
75. Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud, International Organisations and the Politics of Migration, 40
J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 865, 870 (2014).
76. Georgi, supra note 74.
77. Bradley, supra note 69, at 100, 103.
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organization” that engages in diverse activities that are contradictory,
if not controversial.78 The IOM claims a humanitarian
mission—working “to help ensure the orderly and humane
management of migration” and “to provide humanitarian assistance to
migrants in need, including refugees and internally displaced
people.”79 Yet, the IOM’s involvement in the “ordering of movement”
has drawn criticism from human rights organizations for using
coercive practices (such as immigrant detention and refugee
repatriation) that arguably “constrain rather than advance the rights
and well-being of migrants.”80 Indeed, the fact that the IOM receives
funding to undertake activities that are clearly within the purview of
normative agencies (for example, UNHCR) has prompted human
rights organizations to question whether States might strategically
fund the IOM to undertake these activities to avoid more rigorous
application of human rights standards.81
Regarding labor migration specifically, the IOM’s activities have
reflected its entrepreneurial ethos and drawn concern regarding its
normative commitment to migrant worker welfare. The IOM directly
participated in labor recruitment in at least two pilot programs:
working closely with governments to recruit Thai agricultural workers
for work in Israel and to recruit Guatemalan agricultural workers for
work in Quebec.82 Both programs were mired in controversy. The
IOM’s involvement apparently did not curtail the rampant human
rights abuses suffered by the Thai migrant workers—including 122
78. Georgi, supra note 74, at 47.
79. About IOM, supra note 67.
80. Bradley, supra note 77, at 99; Amnesty Int’l, Statement by Amnesty International & Human Rights
Watch to the Governing Council, International Organization for Migration, AI Index: IOR 42/006/2002
(Dec. 2–4, 2002).
81. Ishan Ashutosh & Alison Mountz, Migration Management for the Benefit of Whom? Interrogating
the Work of the International Organization for Migration, 15 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 21, 22 (2011); Human
Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch’s Statement to the IOM Governing Council 29 Nov. – 2 Dec. 2005
(90th
Session),
https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/
mainsite/about_iom/en/council/90/Human%20Rights%20Watch.pdf [https://perma.cc/AWD2-YCPL].
82. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A RAW DEAL: ABUSES OF THAI WORKERS IN ISRAEL’S AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR 16 (2015); Giselle Valarezo, Offloading Migration Management: The Institutionalized Authority
of Non-State Agencies over the Guatemalan Temporary Agricultural Worker to Canada Project, 16 J.
INT’L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 661, 667 (2015).
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deaths—detailed in a Human Rights Watch investigative report.83 As
to the Guatemala–Quebec program, the IOM essentially created a
transnational labor migration corridor that ultimately rendered
Guatemalan migrant workers “extremely vulnerable to manipulation
and abuse.”84 The workers were allegedly mistreated not only by IOM
personnel directly but also by unscrupulous labor recruiters who
emerged after the IOM was forced to end its involvement in the
program, in the wake of corruption scandals involving the Director of
the IOM-Guatemala office.85
B. The IOM’s Non-Normative Mandate
After several decades operating independently of the U.N. system,
in 2016, the IOM chose to become a U.N. “related organization”—a
status held by only two other institutions: the World Trade
Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency.86 The IOM
could have opted to become a U.N. specialized agency. In that
capacity, the IOM would have been brought within the general
accountability mechanisms of the U.N., bound by the U.N. Charter’s
requirement of impartiality, and expected to operate in line with the
normative protective mandates of other U.N. agencies.87 Choosing
instead to become a U.N. related organization enabled the IOM to
maintain its independence. As stated in the U.N.–IOM Agreement
establishing the relationship, the IOM “by virtue of its Constitution,
shall function as an independent, autonomous[,] and non-normative

83. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 82, at 41.
84. Catherine Gabriel & Laura Macdonald, After the International Organization for Migration:
Recruitment of Guatemalan Temporary Agricultural Workers to Canada, 44 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION
STUD. 1706, 1720 (2018).
85. Valarezo, supra note 82, at 671–72.
86. Related Organizations, U.N. SYSTEM, https://www.unsystem.org/members/related-organizations
[https://perma.cc/94DH-KF93] (last visited Mar. 24, 2020).
87. Miriam Cullen, The IOM’s New Status and Its Role Under the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly
and Regular Migration: Pause for Thought, EJIL:TALK! (Mar. 29, 2019), www.ejiltalk.org/the-iomsnew-status-and-its-role-under-the-global-compact-for-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration-pause-forthought/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ38-ULGX].
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international organization in the working relationship with the United
Nations.”88
Notwithstanding its refusal to become a U.N. specialized agency,
the IOM quickly rebranded itself on its website as “U.N.
Migration”—a move interpreted by some as an effort to establish equal
position as the UNHCR, also known as “The U.N. Refugee Agency.”89
The IOM quietly assumed the role of lead migration agency not only
in name but also in practice, as the U.N. transferred to the IOM
increasing responsibility for migration issues that would otherwise
have been handled by the U.N. Secretariat or a U.N. specialized
agency.90 It therefore came as little surprise that the GCM would
ultimately designate the IOM to serve as “the coordinator and
secretariat” of a U.N. network on migration, established “to
ensure . . . coherent system-wide support” to GCM implementation,
including its “capacity-building mechanism.”91 Assigning the IOM
this responsibility was controversial, as it bypassed a number of U.N.
specialized agencies that address labor migration-related issues within
their portfolios and under rights-protective mandates (for example, the
ILO, OHCHR, and UNHCR).92 Tellingly, the U.N. Secretary-General,
in a report providing input on the first draft of the GCM, noted that
strengthening the international community’s work on migration issues
would best be “achieved if, in time, [the] IOM [was] brought more
fully into the United Nations system as a specialized agency, properly
equipped for that role.”93
Contrary to the U.N. Secretary-General’s expressed hope, however,
the IOM remains decidedly non-normative and independent of the
United Nations. As the IOM Director General António Vitorino

88. UN-IOM Agreement, supra note 19 (emphasis added).
89. Martin Geiger & Martin Koch, World Organization in Migration Politics: The International
Organization for Migration, J. INT’L ORG. STUD., Spring 2018, at 25, 32; About IOM, supra note 67; U.N.
REFUGEE AGENCY, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ [https://perma.cc/5VDD-VCFG] (last visited Apr. 5,
2020).
90. Cullen, supra note 87.
91. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 45.
92. Cullen, supra note 87.
93. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 37.
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remarked at a March 2019 event, in response to a direct question
regarding whether the IOM would promote a rights-based agenda:
[I]n the migration field, we do not have an equivalent
normative source that other agencies can build on, like
UNHCR, for instance [with the 1951 Refugee Convention
and its 1967 Protocol], or like ILO who has the Convention
on the Rights of Migrant Workers, in spite of fact that it’s
not widely [ratified]. In the migration policy field, there is
no equivalent normative base, so everything will depend
much more on cooperation, international cooperation of
IOM member states, and international organizations and
member states. That’s the key issue. Life is what it is. And
definitely if you see what has happened with the Global
Compact—it’s quite clear that there are no conditions for
speaking of a normative role equivalent to the ones of other
agencies.94
Yet, as scholars have noted, although the International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families (U.N. Migrant Workers Convention) is poorly ratified,95
many of its provisions echo rights guarantees contained in widely
ratified international human rights treaties.96 Moreover, the GCM’s
preambular language explicitly states that the GCM rests on
international human rights treaties and the ILO conventions on
promoting decent work and labor migration, among other treaties.97
Hence, whether contained in international treaties or in the GCM itself,

94. A Conversation with António Vitorino, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/events/conversation-director-general-international-organizationmigration [https://perma.cc/2YZ2-RWC3].
95. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
https://indicators.ohchr.org [https://perma.cc/J4VW-33N8] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (indicating
fifty-five ratifying States).
96. Ryszard Cholewinski, The Rights of Migrant Workers, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 255
(Ryszard Cholewinski et al. eds., 2007).
97. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 2.
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there is a normative base from which the IOM could draw if it chose
to pursue a rights-based agenda.
III. Migrant Workers’ Rights vs. “Migration as Development”
Close examination of global labor migration dynamics and the
diverse roles the IOM has assumed in migration management
underscore why its lack of a normative protection mandate matters.
Global labor migration is marked by normative and governance gaps,
particularly concerning transnational labor recruitment practices.
Though States remain key players in labor migration, strategic
nonstate actors have also assumed prominent roles. Governments have
increasingly outsourced cross-border labor migration management—a
“de-responsibilization” of state agencies for labor migrants’ rights and
conditions98—to these largely unregulated actors.99 In doing so, they
have fostered the creation of a highly competitive recruitment industry
that tends to prioritize private profit interests over migrant welfare.100
That countries of origin and countries of destination view these
migration pathways as mutually beneficial disincentivizes close
scrutiny of the myriad ways that labor migration structures render
migrants vulnerable to exploitation. Even where States attempt to
minimize the risks migrants face, power imbalances between
States—and between migrants differently situated within racialized
and gendered labor markets, on the one hand, and the various actors
who profit from the migration industry, on the other101—can readily
undermine such efforts.
Given these background dynamics, a rights-based approach is
critical to ensuring meaningful protection of migrant workers.
Otherwise, the balance of interests underlying the GCM could readily
tilt in favor of perpetuating the status quo, prioritizing interests in
border control or labor market access over migrants’ rights protections.
98. Kemp & Raijman, supra note 61, at 608.
99. Id.
100. Valarezo, supra note 82, at 674.
101. Pauline Gardiner Barber & Catherine Bryan, International Organization for Migration in the
Field: ‘Walking the Talk’ of Global Migration Management in Manila, 44 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD.
1725, 1726 (2018).

Published by Reading Room,

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [], Art. 6

1048

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:4

The antitrafficking field is already showing indications of a softening
of rights standards, for example, concerning efforts to address
trafficking in labor supply chains, where proposed interventions have
arguably diverted focus away from state responsibility and towards
corporate social responsibility. Rather than putting sustained pressure
on States to adopt laws and regulations to strengthen labor protections
and accountability mechanisms, pressuring businesses to adopt
voluntary standards and codes of conduct has become an increasingly
dominant rubric in antitrafficking advocacy.
As lead migration agency under the GCM, the IOM could be
well-positioned to reinvigorate and promote a rights-based approach
to labor migration governance. Although the IOM’s past involvement
in creating (and perhaps profiting from) new transnational labor
streams has raised rights concerns, the IOM recently has made a
concerted effort to promote ethical recruitment standards. Upholding
those standards will require, however, the IOM to navigate growing
pressures from development institutions to permit rights tradeoffs for
the sake of increasing labor mobility.
A. A Rights-Based Approach
The GCM empowers the IOM is to oversee a “capacity-building
mechanism,” to which Member States, the U.N., and other relevant
stakeholders, including the private sector and philanthropic
foundations, are invited to contribute resources.102 The mechanism
includes a “connection hub that facilitates demand-driven,
tailor-made[,] and integrated solutions”; a “start-up fund for initial
financing to realize project-oriented solutions”; and a “global
knowledge platform as an online open data source.”103 This, in effect,
assigns the IOM the familiar role of collector and gatekeeper of ideas,
through which it can identify, articulate, and disseminate rights
standards. In its extensive operations on the ground, the IOM often
102. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 39.
103. Id. ¶ 43.
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serves as a hub for policy discussion and debate, integrating a wide
range of state and nonstate actors to incite them to think and act in
similar ways.104 These interactions have enabled the IOM to shape
perceptions of migration. As Professor Pécoud explains, the IOM
makes sense of local migration realities by translating them into
international migration narratives while also translating these
narratives into local expertise via training, capacity-building, and
cooperating with local stakeholders.105
The choice of perspectives with which the IOM might engage in
developing the GCM’s capacity-building mechanism can
predetermine whether the mechanism produces knowledge that
advances rights standards. The IOM’s work on labor migration issues,
past and present, suggests contradictory impulses, however, as to
whether or to what extent the IOM embraces a rights-based approach.
On the one hand, the IOM’s past operations have focused on
controlling and facilitating migration. Its migration management
approach could be viewed as an attempt to overcome the tension
between protectionist border control and the economic need for a
flexible migrant workforce. After all, full control of borders is not only
impossible but potentially counterproductive because it would
undermine the necessary circulation of workers in the globalizing
economy.106 The IOM’s migration approach thus aims to sort good
from bad migration—the orderly and regular from the disorderly and
irregular—such that migration can thereby be “for the benefit of
all.”107 But as Professors Barber and Bryan observe, the IOM’s
policies have constructed “ideal migrants/immigrants as those serving
economic rather than humanitarian interests.”108
On the other hand, IOM’s recent efforts to establish its International
Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS)—“a global initiative that is
104. Julia Brachet, Policing the Desert: The IOM in Libya Beyond War and Peace, 48 ANTIPODE 272,
277 (2016) (emphasis added).
105. Pécoud, supra note 64, at 1633–34.
106. Antoine Pécoud, Informing Migrants to Manage Migration?, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION MANAGEMENT 196 (Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud eds., 2012).
107. Pécoud, supra note 64, at 1627, 1630.
108. Barber & Bryan, supra note 101, at 1728.
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designed to promote ethical international recruitment”109—suggest a
possible effort to expand migrant workers’ rights. Collaborating with
a coalition of government, private sector, and civil society actors, IOM
has established a benchmark for ethical recruitment known as the IRIS
Standard and is developing a voluntary certification scheme for ethical
recruiters to “provide assurance of compliance with the IRIS
Standard.”110 Granted, IRIS might be yet another product of the IOM’s
keen entrepreneurial ability to identify an opportunity and to stake a
claim to expertise and a governance role in a growth area. The
substance of the IRIS Standard reflects, however, a commitment to
promoting international human rights and labor standards. The IRIS
Standard calls upon recruiters to respect all applicable laws related to
labor recruitment as well as the core labor standards recognized in the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
(prohibiting trafficking, forced labor, and child labor, discrimination,
and upholding freedom of association and collective bargaining
rights).111 The IRIS Standard further enumerates specific principles:
prohibiting recruitment fees and related costs to migrant workers, and
ensuring respect for freedom of movement, transparency regarding
terms and conditions of employment, confidentiality and data
protection, and access to remedy.112
These principles find support in the GCM, which includes a number
of suggested actions that clearly prioritize humanitarian interests over
economic ones. For example, the IRIS Standard’s prohibition on
recruitment fees directly aligns with the terms of CGM Objective 6
(fair and ethical recruitment and decent work).113 Whether and to what
extent the IOM relies on the IRIS Standard in advising States on
implementing GCM Objective 6 will test the IOM’s professed
commitment to ethical labor recruitment.

109. INT’L RECRUITMENT INTEGRITY SYS., https://iris.iom.int [https://perma.cc/6L9R-349Y] (last
visited Apr. 5, 2020).
110. IRIS Standard, INT’L RECRUITMENT INTEGRITY SYS., https://iris.iom.int/iris-standard
[https://perma.cc/MB7S-2K4D] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter IRIS Standard].
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. GCM, supra note 14, ¶¶ 16(6), 22(c)
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B. The Migration-Development Nexus
Adopting a rights-based approach, however, will require the IOM to
resist calls from development institutions to prioritize increased labor
mobility even at the cost of certain migrant workers’ rights. The
development field is currently in an “optimistic” period regarding the
so-called “migration-development nexus”114—which views the
remittances migrants send home as crucial tools for reducing poverty
and promoting long-term economic growth.115 Proponents of this
paradigm (MDN proponents) frame migration as a solution to
development, and thus seek increased labor mobility—usually through
proliferation of temporary migration (or guestworker) programs
(TMPs). TMPs typically impose, however, rights restrictions on
participating migrants—the lower the skill level, the greater the
restrictions.116
For MDN proponents, rights restrictions are an acceptable tradeoff
for increased access to remittance-generating jobs in foreign labor
markets. Not only can remittances “bank the unbanked” but they can
also produce macroeconomic benefits such as increased foreign
currency reserves, an improved national credit rating, and an expanded
tax base.117 Migration also yields social remittances in the form of new
ideas, values, skills, and practices that migrants gain while working

114. Professor Hein De Haas likened the debate over the relationship between migration and
development to a pendulum, with optimism regarding the migration-development nexus in the 1950s and
1960s, to pessimism in the 1970s and 1980s, towards more optimistic views in the 1990s and 2000s. See
generally Hein De Haas, Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective, 44 INT’L MIGRATION
REV. 227 (2010) [hereinafter De Haas, Migration and Development].
115. See Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud, Migration, Development and the ‘Migration and
Development Nexus,’ 19 POPULATION, SPACE & PLACE 369 (2013); Hein De Haas, The Migration and
Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Research and Policy, INT’L MIGRATION, June 2012, at 8
[hereinafter De Haas, Pendulum]; Ruby Khan, Remittances; A Development Mantra or a Dutch Disease
for a Developing Country, INT’L J. RES. ECON. & SOC. SCI., Oct. 2019, at 1; Kerry Preibisch et al.,
Pursuing the Capabilities Approach Within the Migration-Development Nexus, 42 J. ETHNIC &
MIGRATION STUD. 2111 (2016).
116. Martin Ruhs & Philip Martin, Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest Worker Programs, 42
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 249, 251 (2008).
117. SOLIDARITY CTR., IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES? PURSUING THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH
WITHIN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION 7 (2014).
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abroad and share with their communities upon their return home.118
Migration offers a cost-effective, bottom-up solution that gives
individuals and their communities direct access to funds and a greater
role in promoting development in their country.119 This is a welcome
alternative to top-down, state-centered macroeconomic solutions
imposed and mediated by (sometimes corrupt) government
bureaucracies.120
The migration-development nexus has drawn its fair share of
criticism, however, not the least of which is the lack of empirical
evidence to support its claims to long-term development
gains121—which, as it turns out, are highly context-dependent.122
Moreover, as Professor Rosser explains, “countries ignore at their own
peril the economic challenges inherent when an economy is injected
with extra capital divorced from national production,” including
inflation and increased inequality between families that receive
remittances and those that do not.123 Indeed, reliance on remittance
incomes can disincentivize local work and has actually fueled
increased migration—especially as young people who have grown up
in households reliant on remittance income now themselves seek
higher-paying jobs abroad.124 This exacerbates the problems of brain
and brawn drain, which reduce the talent and energy required to pursue
the political and economic reforms necessary for meaningful structural
development. Indeed, critics argue, the migration-development
paradigm overlooks features of the global political economy that drive
people to migrate—for example, growing inequality between countries
and within communities, development failures, and poor

118. Id. at 9.
119. Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 371; Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 CONN. L. REV.
3, 52 (2008).
120. SOLIDARITY CTR., supra note 117; Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 371; Rosser, supra note
119.
121. Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 379; De Haas, Migration and Development, supra note 114,
at 236, 242–43.
122. De Haas, Pendulum, supra note 115, at 256.
123. Rosser, supra note 119, at 21–22.
124. Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 370.
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governance.125 It thus absolves States of their responsibility to pursue
necessary reforms to address these causal factors and instead shifts the
burden to migrants to engage in “self-help” development.126 Reflecting
the paradigm’s neoliberal underpinnings, migrants and
markets—instead of States—thus become responsible for bringing
about development.127
These criticisms notwithstanding, development actors have pressed
for establishing more temporary migration programs worldwide to
unleash the full potential of development gains to be had from
remittance-producing migration. Take, for example, the new
organization, Labor Mobility Partnerships (LaMP), launched by the
Center for Global Development, a prominent think tank working to
alleviate poverty.128 LaMP “aims to be the first organization which
actively works to increase rights-respecting labor migration, with a
long-term goal of unlocking billions in income gains from people
filling needed jobs.”129 LaMP shares the IOM’s “triple win” view of
migration—namely, that with productive policies in place, an increase
in migration can create new opportunities and benefits for host
countries, origin countries, and migrants.130 Consequently, LaMP
argues that rather than restricting migration (as most destination
countries are inclined to do), governments should instead develop laws
and policies to maximize the benefits of migration.131
125. De Haas, Migration and Development, supra note 114, at 236; Preibisch et al., supra note 115, at
2115–16.
126. Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 371; De Haas, Migration and Development, supra note 114,
at 234, 236.
127. De Haas, Migration and Development, supra note 114, at 236, 245–46; Rosser, supra note 119, at
51–52.
128. Labor Mobility Partnerships (LaMP): Helping Connect International Labor Markets, CTR. GLOB
DEV., https://www.cgdev.org/page/labor-mobility-partnerships-lamp-helping-connect-internationallabor-markets [https://perma.cc/RQ3Y-95ZJ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter Labor Mobility
Partnerships (LaMP)].
129. Id.
130. Host countries can benefit from higher incomes and employment rates for native workers,
increased innovation, and net positive fiscal effects. Migrants and their origin countries can benefit from
higher incomes for migrants’ families back home through remittances, which in turn can create other
positive effects such as improved education and nutrition outcomes. Origin countries, furthermore, can
benefit from knowledge and technology transfers that diversify and benefit the economy. MICHAEL
CLEMENS ET AL., MIGRATION IS WHAT YOU MAKE IT: SEVEN POLICY DECISIONS THAT TURNED
CHALLENGES INTO OPPORTUNITIES, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV. 2 (2018).
131. Id.
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Although rights advocates would agree that labor migration could
pose a triple win under certain conditions, the perspective LaMP
articulates below offers a major point of disagreement:
If more legal channels for labor mobility were opened, the
incomes of developing country citizens could increase
fourfold while global GDP could as much as double. These
potential gains make labor mobility one of the most powerful
tools for poverty alleviation currently on the current
development agenda.
Despite this fact, the international community provides
little support to migrant sending and receiving countries
struggling to connect potential migrants (who need jobs) to
potential employers (who need workers). The available
support often promotes international standards which may
have little to do with local circumstances and needs.
This leaves many countries with critical unanswered
demand for support in an era when labor mobility is
increasing and desperately needed.132
In other words, adherence to international rights standards is a
problematic barrier to labor mobility. This perspective invokes the
“numbers versus rights” debate in migration policy.133 As Professors
Ruhs and Martin explain, as an empirical matter, “there is a trade-off,
i.e., an inverse relationship between the number and rights of migrants
employed in low-skilled jobs in high-income countries.”134 Increasing
migrant numbers comes at the sacrifice of migrants’ rights. The
questions of whether and how to accept such conditions as a matter of
migration policy are deeply divisive, and the responses reflect
fundamentally divergent perspectives on migrant workers.135

132. Labor Mobility Partnerships (LaMP), supra note 128 (emphasis added).
133. See generally MARTIN RUHS, THE PRICE OF RIGHTS (2013); Ruhs & Martin, supra note 116.
134. Ruhs & Martin, supra note 116.
135. Compare RUHS, supra note 133, 154–86 (proposing a set of rights tradeoffs), with Preibisch et al.,
supra note 115, at 2120–23 (criticizing the policy focus on the “rights versus numbers” debate).
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On the one hand are those (including human rights and labor
advocates) who view migrant workers as, in a sense, victims of broader
forces that push and pull them over national boundaries (e.g.,
inequality, climate change). As such, migrant workers are deserving of
special rights protections, especially considering the significant
economic and social costs of migration that migrants and their families
must endure (e.g., the psychological impact of family separation). For
migrants’ rights advocates, the willingness to sacrifice migrants’ rights
in pursuit of uncertain economic gains signifies a disturbingly thin
view of development that fails to appreciate the importance of
expanding human capabilities as a measure of development
progress.136 On the other hand, are those (including MDN proponents)
who perceive migrant workers as rational economic actors who
can—and do—willingly assume rights tradeoffs to gain access to jobs
abroad.137 Hence, accepting rights tradeoffs is a pragmatic choice that
also honors migrants’ decisions to become “agents of development.”
Adopting the latter view, LaMP’s policy prescriptions focus on the
question of which rights to afford or deny to migrant workers to
maximize labor mobility and harness the development gains from
remittances. LaMP has argued, for example, against a prohibition on
recruitment fees (or “zero-fee recruitment”)—a position contrary to
the IRIS Standards, the GCM’s suggested measures, and the
preference of rights advocates.138 According to LaMP, zero-fee
recruitment (1) ignores migrants’ willingness to pay recruitment fees
as an “investment” that can yield “vast gains”; (2) ignores the fact that
there are real costs associated with recruitment services; and (3) relies
solely on governments’ ability to regulate and enforce transactions
over which, in practice, they exert little control.139 LaMP
acknowledges that migrants take on debt to pay (often exorbitant)
recruitment fees, providing recruiters (and employers) leverage to
136. Geiger & Pécoud, supra note 115, at 372; Preibisch et al., supra note 115, at 2112.
137. RUHS, supra note 133, at 39–52; Ruhs & Martin, supra note 116, at 259.
138. Rebekah Smith & Richard Johnson, Introducing an Outcomes-Based Migrant Welfare Fund,
LAMP F.: BLOG (Jan. 16, 2020), https://lampforum.org/2020/01/16/introducing-an-outcomes-basedmigrant-welfare-fund/ [https://perma.cc/2US5-MA5S].
139. Id.
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engage in abusive practices. But instead of prohibiting recruitment
fees, LaMP proposes creating an “outcomes-based migrant welfare
fund” that would fund recruitment of workers as well as “the necessary
government institutions for protections and oversight.”140 The fund
would begin with an infusion of funds from social investors, but
eventually become self-financing through contributions from the
migrant workers, who pay a percentage of their salary to the fund if
they “successfully find and sustain quality employment.”141 The
recruiters would have “outcomes-based contracts,” with payments for
their services contingent on the quantity and quality of jobs they secure
for workers. LaMP argues that this is a better model than zero-fees
recruitment because it aligns the incentives of workers, employers, and
governments using outcome-based contracting.
From a rights perspective, LaMP’s proposal perhaps has surface
appeal for attempting to disincentivize recruitment abuse by making
payment of recruitment fees contingent on satisfactory outcomes. But
the proposal raises too many questions to inspire confidence in its
workability. Who determines, and by what standards, whether an
outcome is satisfactory? Are there protections against unsatisfied
workers from being blacklisted by future recruiters? The realities of
how unequal bargaining power between employer/recruiter and
migrant worker manifests invites skepticism towards any proposal that
does not meaningfully protect workers’ power to demand better
working conditions.
But even beyond issues of practical application, LaMP’s proposal
contradicts a core principle of ethical recruitment frameworks such as
that embraced by IRIS: that no worker should have to pay for a job.
Under the “Employers Pay” principle that IRIS promotes, the costs of
recruitment should instead be borne by employers.142 Not only do
employers benefit from access to flexible and affordable labor markets
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Fair for Employers, INT’L RECRUITMENT INTEGRITY SYS., https://iris.iom.int/fair-employers
[https://perma.cc/PAZ6-VH83] (last visited May 18, 2020) (discussing the “Employer Pays” principle);
IRIS Standard, supra note 110 (Prohibition of Recruitment Fees and Related Costs to Migrant Workers).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss4/6

30

Chuang: Preventing Trafficking Through New Global Governance over Labor M

2020]

PREVENTING TRAFFICKING

1057

but they are better positioned to cover recruitment costs. Moreover, the
GCM explicitly recommends that States prohibit recruitment fees “in
order to prevent debt bondage, exploitation and forced labor.”143
Prohibiting recruitment fees is a crucial structural reform of
cross-border labor recruitment practices that otherwise afford
unscrupulous recruiters and employers leverage to maintain
substandard if not abusive labor conditions. Rights tradeoffs in this
context thus can only create and sustain migrants’ vulnerability to
trafficking.
In advising States on GCM implementation, the IOM could hold the
line with respect to the rights tradeoffs proposed by LaMP and other
adherents of the migration-development paradigm. While a
rights-based approach to recruitment coincides with IOM’s own work
promoting ethical recruitment through IRIS, recruitment is but one of
a number of areas for which the IOM could tilt the balance of
competing interests towards migrants’ rights protections. The GCM is
rife with suggested actions for States to take to reduce vulnerability to
exploitation and abuse—many, if not all, of which find normative
grounding in international human rights and labor laws.
CONCLUSION
Given the strong State and nonstate actor interests in prioritizing the
border control and improved labor market access aspects of the GCM
over those pertaining to migrant welfare, the IOM might not naturally
be inclined to promote a rights-based agenda on its own initiative. At
the same time, however, the IOM’s work on the IRIS project suggests
an opportunity for the IOM to become a standard-bearer in the field of
international labor recruitment. In this and other areas, the IOM could
elevate and promote the GCM’s provisions that seek to improve
migrant welfare. After all, the GCM remains a potentially useful tool
for preventing trafficking on many other fronts. Eliminating
employer-tying of visas and providing meaningful anti-retaliation
143. GCM, supra note 14, ¶ 22(c) (under Objective 6: facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and
safeguard conditions that ensure decent work).
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protections, for example, would address significant structural
contributors to the problem of human trafficking. These features of
how global labor migration is currently structured are deeply
embedded in the practices and policies of countries of destination and
of origin. Realizing the GCM’s transformative potential will therefore
require rights advocates to closely scrutinize and inform the IOM’s
efforts to guide States’ implementation of the GCM. Doing so with an
eye to ensuring that States incorporate these and other worker
protections could meaningfully advance overdue efforts to prevent
human trafficking in the long term.
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